JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Debates about women's nature are very old but far from over. In fact they have acquired a new urgency with the rise of the women's movement and with the dramatic increase in the number of women in the work force. Conservatives claim that there is a distinct women's nature that puts limits on the extent to which the traditional sexual/social roles can and should be altered. Feminists usually reject the idea, correctly pointing out that it has been used to justify women's oppression for thousands of years. In this article I attempt to develop a Marxist approach to the question. Though such an approach is nowhere explicitly taken by Marx or Engels, it is a plausible development of their views. Marx held human nature to be determined by the social forms of human labor. I will bring out his general realist methodology and his perspective on the relation between the biological and the social. Given my interpretation of the facts about psychological differences between the sexes and the probable dependence of these differences on the sexual division of labor, this approach entails that women probably do have distinct natures. (It similarly entails that men probably have distinct natures since there is no reason to take men as the norm.) However, contrary to the usual assumption, it does not follow that sexual/social roles cannot or should not be radically altered, for men's and women's natures are socially constituted and historically evolving. 
1.
As is well known, one of the most controversial areas of Marxist scholarship is whether Marx had a theory of human nature in his later work and, if so, whether it is significantly different from his earlier one. The interpretation I give below is consistent with both his early and his later work (as indicated by references). So there is some common theory of human nature, although there are also differences between his early and late ideas which are not relevant to my concerns in this paper.
2. Karl Marx, Grundrisse (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 92.
the transhistorical features of human beings would not be able to do. To say in detail what these historically specific structures are and how they work would require a more adequate psychological theory than presently exists, one that integrates social and historical factors. However, an explanation of the varieties of human personality and behavior requires some such hypothesis of historically specific structures. This indicates a line of future research.5 Talk of "determining structures" is not inconsistent with Marx's conception of human beings as historical agents. Individually and collectively, human beings often do what they do because of their beliefs, desires, and purposes. Human beings are free in this sense. But Marx stresses that human freedom is exercised only within certain constraints-set by social, historical, and economic conditions as well as biological facts. Talk of social groups with natures is a way of bringing out those constraints. For example, we can better predict John Smith's economic behavior by knowing that he is a capitalist than by knowing his preferences, skills, personality, and character traits.
The psychophysical structures produced by the sorts of labor that people do and the resultant social relations would constitute the nature of human beings qua social beings. Although there are certain features common to these structures, they vary as a whole from one mode of production to another. Marx is denying that there is a human nature in the traditional, transhistorical sense. On his view, however, there are historically specific forms of human nature, that is, human nature specific to feudalism, to capitalism, to socialism, and so on. In traditional terminology, the (variable) psychophysical structures would be the (variable) 5. Some fascinating work along these lines was done by the early Soviet psychologists, Lev Vygotsky and A. R. Luria, who defined psychology to mean "the science of the sociohistorical shaping of mental activity and of the structures of mental processes which depend utterly on the basic forms of social practice and the major stages in the historical development of society" (Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976], p. 164). In a study of Central Asian peasants in the early 1930s, they discovered significant differences in the mode as well as the content of cognition between those living on a collective farm for two years and those engaged in traditional peasant agriculture. Specifically, the latter had difficulty with simple syllogisms while the former did not; and the latter classified objects according to what Luria called a "graphicfunctional" mode as opposed to the "abstract-theoretical" mode used by the former. In attempting to give a material basis for his approach, Luria made innovative contributions to neuropsychology. Unfortunately, they did not explore the connections between social structure and noncognitive aspects of mental life. These seminal ideas have never really been developed. 
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April 1984 real essence of human beings qua social beings, and the forms of personality and behavior to which they give rise would be the nominal essence. This acceptance of natures in the social world implies that, contrary to traditional assumptions, natures can change. Even for biological natures, however, the assumption that natures must be unchanging became less plausible after the discovery of evolution. If species can be understood as evolving sorts of things, why must natures be understood as unchanging? In Marx's view, the contrast of the social with the natural and unchanging is particularly inappropriate to human beings since they are by nature social beings with a history.
II
Let us try to apply this approach to the question of whether women (and men) can be said to have distinct natures. Distinct sex-linked natures are supposed to account for (and to justify) the distinct social roles of women and men. It is important to see first of all that the defining biological differences between men and women cannot by themselves play this explanatory role, much less the justificatory one. A woman is defined as a typical member of the female sex, which is distinguished from the male sex by its ability to conceive and bear children. Whether these biological differences cause the social differences is an empirical question that we shall discuss shortly. However, to say that men and women have distinct natures so defined would be to utter a tautology. We are looking for the nature of women and men as social groups, not as biological groups. Do, then, men and women as social beings have distinct natures? If there are generalizations subsumable under a theory, explanatory of behavior distinctive of a given social group, this suggests that the group has a distinct nature. Indeed there are many generalizations we can make about women's behavior and roles within given cultures and many that are true cross-culturally as well. Compared to men, women spend more time taking care of children and doing other household tasks; they have less social, economic, and political power in society at large and in almost every subgroup in society; their work outside the home, if any, is usually related to the work they do inside the home; they tend to cry more easily, dress and adorn themselves distinctively, tend to have distinct recreations and pleasures, and so on.
What is the explanation? Discrimination and direct social pressure are undoubtedly part of it. But are there differences between men and women themselves that underlie the behavioral differences? Many claim that biological differences between the sexes are the most important part of the explanation.6 However, it is highly implausible that biological differences could directly determine the social differences. If biological facts are critical determinants of sexual/social roles, the connection is most likely to run through psychology; that is, biological differences cause or predispose psychological differences, which in turn cause differences in social roles. The first question, then, is whether there are psychological differences between the sexes that are relevant to their respective social roles: for example, that women are more nurturant than men and hence are more appropriate caretakers of children. If there are such differences, the next question will be about their source.
Both these questions are controversial, even among the experts. Despite this and my own serious reservations about much of the research,7 I believe that research to show that there exist statistically significant psychological sex differences of a sort that are relevant to the different social roles men and women play.8
Any position regarding the source of these differences is necessarily somewhat speculative since, by and large, the researchers look only for statistically significant relationships and do not try to establish cause and effect. The prevailing hostility among academic research psychologists to any theoretical framework makes it difficult to assess the data since the significance of the data and even what needs to be explained is to some extent dependent on a theory. But the following findings strongly support the view that social factors are the primary determinants:9 (1) Black males and white females, different biologically but with similar social handicaps, are similar in patterns of achievement scores and fear 7. These reservations are based on the following objections: First, the research is confined to artificial situations and narrow cultural contexts. Second, it concentrates on statistically significant differences and ignores the magnitude, overlap, and importance of the features. And third, it lacks a theoretical framework with which to evaluate the findings. We have at present ample evidence of environmental shaping of sex-differentiated behavior, so ample in fact that it is sufficient to account for the cognitive and personality differences we observe in children and adults. Although it is possible that future research will discover biological factors as well, there is no reason to expect this will happen. The social roles of men and women that are related to psychological sex differences are not universal cross-culturally, but they are very prevalent. 14. Romer, pp. 7, 124. Studies show that parents (as well as society) project fewer clear sex-role expectations on babies than on young children and adolescents. However, such stereotypes are projected throughout the human life: there is no time that can safely be said to be prior to socialization. Studies show that parents describe newborns in sexstereotypic ways, even though hospital records show no objective differences, and that parents behave differently toward boy and girl babies even though they are unaware of it. Cited in ibid., pp. 139-40, nn. 3, 4, 5, 6. Sex-differentiated socialization patterns also show little cross-cultural variation, with girls being trained for nurturance and responsibility and boys for achievement and self-reliance in both developed and underdeveloped societies.'5 This strongly suggests that many, though not all, of the psychological differences between men and women are very prevalent, though not universal, cross-culturally. They are not universal to all women even within this culture. Something like the following is probably true: there is a common core of psychological traits found more among women than among men throughout the world, but women belonging to different cultures or subcultures have different subsets of this common core of traits. Though there is not enough rigorous cross-cultural psychological research to say for sure, this opinion accords with the anthropological data we do have.'6 There seem, then, to be several levels of generalizations (sociological, psychological, etc.) that are distinctive of women. By itself, however, this by no means implies that there is a distinct women's nature. As we saw in our discussion of taxonomy, the differences must be of a kind that is theoretically important. Following Marx's approach, we should expect psychological differences to be connected to differences in the sorts of labor that women do in society and to the resulting differences in social relations. Universally there is and has always been a sexual division of labor. Although there are some variations as to what labor each sex does, men generally have primary responsibility for subsistence activities; women's contribution to this varies. What does not vary is that, whatever else they do, women have primary responsibility for child care and most of the everyday household work. Their contribution to subsistence depends on its compatibility with child care."
Several cross-cultural studies support the Marxist assumption that it is women's distinctive labor and the different social relations resulting from it that are critical in determining these personality differences.'8 
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April 1984 Striking parallels exist between cultural and sexual differences; that is, cultures differ along the same lines as those along which men and women differ in most societies. Some cultures exhibit the sort of behavior and personality usually considered masculine: everyone tends to be independent, achievement oriented, and assertive (although women still are less so than men are in the culture). In other cultures everyone tends to be compliant, obedient, and responsible-the sort of personality associated with women. Critical for us is that the differences in the "personalities" of cultures are correlated with different economies. Where animal husbandry and agriculture are the primary sources of subsistence, obedience and responsibility are essential whereas experimentation and individual initiative would be dangerous. But societies which depend largely on hunting and fishing benefit from experimentation and individual initiative and are less threatened by disobedience and irresponsibility. Women in the latter societies tend both to fish and to have their more traditional responsibilities. Though more "masculine" than men and women in other cultures, they are less "masculine" than men in their own cultures. It seems plausible to say therefore that the differences between men and women can be explained by the different sorts of labor that they do. Within our own society, certain psychological differences between young black and young white women lend support to the hypothesis. While wealthy black adolescent girls share the traditional (white) version of femininity,'9 black adolescent girls from poor and working-class families (i.e., the majority) accept the very different values for women of strength and independence.20 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the psychological differences between young black and young white women reflect the fact that black women have historically almost always been employed outside the home. Now the Marxist view is not that there is a direct causal connection between the type of labor people do and their personality structure. Rather, the type of labor people do puts them into certain social relations, and these relations are institutionalized into sets of practices, institutions, cultural agencies, and so on. In the case of the sexual division of labor, the most important of these institutions is the family. The generalizations true of women and not men describe emotions and behavior that reflect specific cognitive/affective structures more often found among women. My contention is that there is probably a common core of psychological traits found more often among women than among men throughout the world, of which women of different subculturess have different subsets. The cognitive/affective structures generate the different sets of traits under different conditions. Although our knowledge at this point is too meager to say much about these structures, an adequate explanation of the differences requires that we posit such structures. What we need is a psychological theory supplemented by social and historical considerations of the kind discussed here.2" In the traditional terminology the cognitive/affective structures would be the real essence; the disjunctive set of traits would be the nominal essence. Although the underlying structures which give rise to the different traits would more properly be called the distinct nature of women, for ordinary purposes the nature of women could be taken to be the systematically related sets of properties to which these structures give rise.
That these properties are not universal is not a reason to reject the claim that they constitute a nature. This might seem surprising, but actually it accords with the approach used in taxonomy. Contrary to Aristotelian essentialism, classifications made in biology do not require that the defining characteristics be individually necessary and jointly sufficient. The actual distribution of properties among organisms is such that most taxa names can be defined only disjunctively. Any of the disjuncts 
III
Let me digress for a bit to consider the objection that my arguments show that it is the biological differences between men and women and not social factors that account for these personality differences. After all, it might be argued, it is the fact that women can bear and nurse children that is the basis of the sexual/social division of labor. So, even if the latter plays some causal role as well, it is not the most basic explanation.
This point is interesting but mistaken. Not every biological difference constitutes a difference in natures. It depends on how significant causally the difference is and hence how explanatory it is. We have already seen that women are not the same at all times and in all cultures and that cultures as a whole exhibit differences similar to those between men and women in most (though not all) cultures. The biological facts -just because they are universal-cannot explain these social and historical variations. A theory which could explain them would have to be a social-historical theory. Thus, although it is obviously true that the sexual division of labor rests on the reproductive differences between the sexes, these do not constitute a difference in the natures of men and women as social beings. The significance of the biological differences depends on socialhistorical facts and, moreover, is maintained in every society by complicated social practices. Hence the difference in natures is primarily social and historical.
Consider this example (which I would claim to be analogous): suppose that the division of slaves into house and field workers was based entirely on the slaves' size and strength, bigger and stronger slaves becoming field workers, smaller and weaker ones becoming house workers. It is well known that there were differences in attitudes and, to some extent, personality between house and field slaves. What was the cause of these differences? Most writers point to the differences in work, working conditions, and social relations of house and field slaves. If different social conditions would have produced different psychological results, then it would be mistaken to point to the physical differences as the causeeven though they were the basis on which house and field slaves were placed in their respective social conditions. Now some might try to extend my argument and claim not only that the differences in natures between men and women are social and historical in origin but also that the very division into men and women is social and historical in origin. After all, there is an enormous physical variety among infants and among adults. And physical similarities and differences do not by themselves determine any particular division into groups. Rather it is the significance that society gives to the physical characteristics that does this. Similar arguments regarding the classification of humanity into races are generally accepted today by informed people.
Though interesting, this argument goes wrong in its assumption as to what constitutes a biological or "natural" distinction as opposed to one that is social or historical in origin. Nothing is a "given fact of nature" in the sense presupposed in the argument. It is true that it is the significance of physical similarities and differences, rather than the physical similarities themselves, that determines a classification. Nevertheless, given that the sex difference is what allows for physical reproduction of most kinds of things, and that the distinction between things that reproduce sexually and those that reproduce by some other means is a very important one in biology, the division into two sexes has great importance for biological theory. The basis of the division into two sexes, then, is much the same as the division into species. Why should the sexual division not be called a natural distinction as well? Only if human beings were to cease to reproduce themselves sexually might the distinction between men and women cease to be of critical biological importance and hence cease to be a fundamental biological distinction. (Since they still could reproduce in the old way, however, it would still have some biological importance.) Even if that should come to pass, it would not show that until then the distinction between men and women was not a biological one. What is social and historical in origin is what is made of the distinction.
IV
It must not be forgotten that the similarities between men and women are greater than their differences. These similarities constitute their common human nature, as both biological and social beings. But within the sociohistorical category of human beings, I have argued that there are sex-differentiated natures. An individual woman will have this women's nature as a part of her human nature. She is, of course, a particular woman and more than just a woman. Aside from being human, she is, among other things, of a particular social class, race, and culture. These are categories that cut across sex lines, and some will be as important as her sex or more important. Given the methodology I am using, this means that every individual has or is constituted by several natures. There is no contradiction in this. It simply shows that there are several different sorts of facts about people and that these require different sorts of explanations, however these facts and explanations are ultimately related. There need be no conflict between the different sorts of explanations;
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April 1984 different areas of a woman's behavior can be explained by different aspects of her total nature. In certain conditions, however, there might be a conflict. A woman who is a wife and mother and also a wage worker will have needs and propensities based on these social relations. These will sometimes conflict, such as when she has a union meeting and responsibilities at home at the same time. Particular conditions will also make a difference: if there is a strike going on she will be more likely to go to the union meeting than at other times. We should look for theories to explain under what conditions each factor will be most important, how factors interact, and how these correlations could change given other conditions. Our theories should also explain why all this is so. Though talk of women's nature does not, on my account, imply that it is immutable, it does imply that it is not easily changed. The Marxist conception of a thing's nature is of something underlying and explanatory of its observable behavior. But being explanatory is not sufficient to be part of a thing's nature. Only those traits belong to a thing's nature that are systematically related, explain a variety of systematically related behavior, and are subsumable in a theoretical framework. Such features do not easily and suddenly change. A sexual division of labor with resultant psychological sex differences has been near to universal, despite variations. Today, however, things may be changing. Only a small minority of Americans (11 percent) live in the traditional nuclear family of breadwinning father, homemaker mother, and two or more children. Forty-five percent of the work force is made up of women. On the other hand, the jobs that women do for wages tend to be related to their traditional and subordinate social role: they assist, nurse, teach, serve, and clean up after others in their wage work as well as in the home. Moreover, women still do most of the parenting and housework whether or not they do wage work.22 How much this can change within capitalism is a complicated and controversial question. And how quickly the psychological differences between the sexes would disappear if the social differences were removed remains to be seen.
In neither capitalist nor noncapitalist societies has the entry of women into paid labor been sufficient to change traditional sex roles.23 Although one part of the traditional sexual division of labor has changed, the most important part has not. Women are oppressed by their "double duty" in both forms of society. That women working outside the home still do most of the child care and housework has to be attributed in part to psychological differences between the sexes. Even women leading fairly untraditional lives still tend to hold many of the traditional assumptions, values, expectations, and self-conceptions on a deep level. So I do not think the psychological changes will be so rapid as to refute my talk of them as "natures." On the other hand, these psychological attributes seem to be very much dependent on the objective, economic power relations between men and women. Thus, in the working class, where women's wages are a higher proportion of family income than they are in the middle class, studies show that women gain more power from employ- one's own beliefs and desires. In Marx's theory, consciousness, and much of what is taken to be human nature, is formed by the social system in which people live. This is not to say that it is formed in every detail or that human beings are mere passive products of their society. It is to say that the broad outlines, the limits, are set by the mode of production and one's place in it. Until the institution of socialism/communism, the mode of production is not under the control of the people who live under it; social relations are exploitative and oppressive. Under socialism/ communism, social relations are not exploitative because the mode of production is under conscious collective control. This means that the social determinants of human nature are under human control. Consequently there is a basis for saying that the needs, wants, and capacities that constitute the human nature of socialism and communism are acquired more freely than are those that constitute the human nature of other epochs.
There is another reason-also having to do with freedom-why Marx had a preference for the human nature of socialism and communism. As we have seen, of all the different features of a species, Marx emphasized the characteristic form of life activity as key to the nature of that species. Free, conscious activity is a transhistorical capacity of human beings that is unique to them, but it is only fully developed and realized in socialism and communism. Only when social need is the basis of production and production is under conscious collective control will there be a significant reduction of necessary labor time, beyond which, Marx says, "begins that development of human energy which is a need in itself, the true realm of freedom." He refers to this sort of labor which is only possible for most people under socialism and communism as "self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom."26 Thus the human nature of socialism and communism can be said to be more free than that of previous societies in two senses: first, a key aspect of this human nature is the expression of freedom, and second, the determinants of many other aspects of human nature are under people's conscious, collective control for the first time. For this reason and because it is the most developed form of what is peculiar to human beings, Marx sometimes referred to it as the most truly human nature.27 A higher value is put on a society in which human nature takes this form because freedom is a basic value. The women's nature discussed in this paper is disanalogous to human nature in many respects. Most important is the fact that, while there will 
April 1984 always be a distinctive human nature, even in socialism/communism, it seems unlikely that there will always be a distinct women's nature. Except as a remnant of the past, there seems little reason to think that there would still be a women's nature in socialism/communism, either the present one or one specific to that society. The biological differences between men and women would remain, but this does not constitute a difference in nature for reasons discussed earlier. Moreover, the biological differences do not by themselves determine the present psychological differences between men and women. Rather, it is the sexual/social division of labor and the resulting sexually differentiated social relations and socialization that explain the differences. In Marx's theory this is determined not by biology but primarily by oppressive social, economic, and historical conditions which are not present in socialism/communism. Socialism/communism for Marx is a society of self-governing producers, the self-emancipation of the working class. Since this can come into being and survive only with the full participation of both sexes, a struggle for women's liberation is integral to the struggle for socialism. Furthermore, in a socialist society in Marx's sense there is no economic basis for women's oppression as there is in capitalism. While there might be some lingering material and psychological basis in the advantages to men, the nature both of a successful struggle for socialism and of a genuinely socialist society would substantially reduce the strength, efficacy, and longevity of such tendencies. Now it is not impossible that the biological differences between men and women would still produce psychological differences under socialism/ communism. Free, conscious activity will not take the same concrete form for everyone, and it is possible that these forms will differ along sexual lines. However, since there does not appear to be a direct biologicalpsychological link now, why should there be then? One could say that there would always have to be some differences in men's and women's experience of themselves as physical beings, but exactly what this means or how one would determine it is somewhat obscure. In any case, unless they were expressed in social practices and institutions, such differences, if they existed, would not have the kind of importance that would warrant speaking of them as distinct men's and women's natures. The sexual and reproductive choices women make would not have the kind of profound social consequences for women as opposed to men that they do now. So women's needs and interests, in this central and currently sex-differentiated realm, would differ very little from men's.
As we saw, the reason Marx gave a preference to the human nature of socialism and communism is that it is more freely acquired than previous forms of human nature, and freedom is a key constituent of human nature. Neither of these considerations applies to the present (and past) sex-related natures. Freedom is not a constituent of (present and past) sex-related natures, and there is no basis for saying that they were freely acquired. There is little reason to think that what is truly unique to women, bearing children, is what they would freely choose to do more than anything else. The biological differences are the basis, along with economic, social, and historical conditions, for the sexual/social division of labor and the resulting social relations -none of which are under their control. Thus the psychological sex differences that result and that constitute sex-differentiated natures are not under their control. Furthermore, ignoring the legal restrictions that exist or that have been lifted only recently, women's traditional social role and the nature associated with it involves less freedom than men's. Being a wife and mother is supposed to be women's primary aim and self-definition, and the traits desirable for women are those that make them better able to fulfill this rolebeing attractive to men and able to satisfy a family's needs. Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether this life is inherently less challenging and empowering than most men's lives (hence less free in Marx's sense), the point is that this is only one choice. In developed countries, at least, men have many more choices. And though, obviously, as many men are fathers as women are mothers, men are first and foremost doctors, lawyers, tailors, and sailors. Unless this is what women would be inclined to do anyway, this implies that there are greater social pressures on women than on men. When women do take on other jobs, they are still constrained by the traditional values and expectations. Standing in the way of women's wholehearted pursuit of other options are not only the objective constraints of sex discrimination and family responsibilities but, in addition, their own conflicting feelings of obligation, conflicting desires, and even habits (for example, spending a lot of time on their personal appearance). Women's lives are less free than men's are both because they are dependent on men and because they have children dependent on them. Traditional sexual values constrain women more than they do men. And women, being as a rule more passive and oriented to other people's wishes than men are, are less able to act to realize their own desires. In all these ways the present women's nature lacks the freedom involved in the human nature of socialism/communism as envisioned by Marx.
But any women's nature or indeed any sex-differentiated nature would lack this freedom. Indeed there is a contradiction in the very idea of a society in which the human nature distinctive of socialism/communism and this distinctive women's nature are both fully realized. Women (and men) are human beings. They could not simultaneously realize a limited nature determined by limiting social conditions and a nature whose essence is freedom. By definition, any sex-differentiated nature would be more limited than one not so differentiated. And while there is nothing that absolutely precludes sex-differentiated natures from being freely acquired, there seem very good empirical grounds for rejecting the idea that they could be.
